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“Though more work always remains, the physical sciences have accomplished their 
core task when it comes to climate change. We know what we need to know about the 
causes and consequences of our actions. What we don’t know is how to stop ourselves, 
which is why … the social sciences are so important from here on out.” 
 
 
Bill McKibben (blurb on back cover of R. E. Dunlap & R. J. Brulle (Eds.) (2015). 






 Although Americans are becoming increasingly concerned about climate 
change, only one in five Americans hear people they know talk about the issue at 
least once a month. This has been described as a “spiral of silence,” because when 
people don’t hear others talk about climate change, they tend not to talk or think 
about it themselves. This paper examines climate silence in the United States, 
arguing that climate silence can be more subtle than simply not talking about 
climate change, such as where people talk about certain aspects of climate change, 
but avoid mentioning the more disturbing or negative implications of climate 
change.   
 The paper considers two major theories developed by Albert Bandura at 
Stanford University, self-efficacy and moral disengagement theory. In his recent 
book Moral Disengagement Bandura links climate change to U.S. overconsumption, 
“excessive consumerism,” “unbridled economic self-interest,” “free-market 
principles,” “free-market fundamentalists,” and our “market-driven culture.” These 
arguments align Bandura with scholars and writers who urge Americans to focus on 
capitalism, economic growth, neoliberalism, and overconsumption as both the 
causes of climate change, and major obstacles to addressing it. 
 The paper concludes that in challenging moral disengagement surrounding 
climate change, climate activists and climate communicators would be well advised 
to consider both of Bandura’s theories, and to consult a growing literature in 
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 In February 2017 I interviewed the renowned Stanford emeritus professor 
Albert Bandura at his home in Stanford, California, to discuss climate change. The final 
chapter of Bandura’s recent book, Moral Disengagement: How Good People Can Do 
Harm and Feel Good About Themselves, is about climate change and other 
environmental harms. Bandura’s earlier work on self-efficacy and collective efficacy is 
also highly relevant to our climate-change predicament. In this paper I report on our 
conversation and on the relevance of Bandura’s theories to our nation’s efforts to 




 Americans are becoming increasingly concerned about climate change 
(Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Rosenthal, & Cutler, 2017). Yet many 
Americans rarely talk about it or hear others talk (or write) about it, whether in the 
media or in everyday conversations. Maibach and colleagues call this a “climate 
spiral of silence,” where “even people who care about the issue, shy away from 
discussing it because they so infrequently hear other people talking about it—
reinforcing the spiral” (Maibach, Leiserowitz, Rosenthal, Roser-Renouf, & Cutler, 
2016). And even when Americans do talk about climate change, they often fail to 
discuss it in depth, or with complete candor. 
 Pope Francis’s 2015 encyclical, Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home, 
with its urgent moral arguments for addressing climate change, helped raise 
awareness of the issue in the U.S., and appears to have led to a small increase in the 
number of Americans who saw climate change as a moral issue (Maibach et al., 
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2015). But even with that increase most Americans failed to see climate change as a 
moral issue, and the most recent polling shows that 2015’s small increase in moral 
awareness was temporary. Moral concern about climate change has receded in the 
year following the pope’s U.S. visit (Leiserowitz et al., 2017).  
 There was no discussion of climate change in the 2012 presidential debates 
between President Obama and Mitt Romney and very little in the 2016 debates 
between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, including no climate questions from 
moderators. David Orr has said “[h]ow we think about climate destabilization has a 
great deal to do with how we talk about it” (Orr, 2012)(xiv).  A corollary to that 
might be “whether and how we talk about climate change has a great deal to do with 
how much and how deeply we think about it.” And if we aren’t thinking much or 
very deeply about climate change and all its ramifications, we are unlikely to fully 
understand the problem or address it wisely or with an appropriate degree of 
urgency. 
 This paper explores climate silence in America, focusing on two theories of 
the psychologist Albert Bandura, an emeritus professor at Stanford University. Each 
theory is the subject (and title) of a major book by Bandura, preceded by years’ 
worth of research and journal articles (Bandura, 1997, 2016). Both theories were 
also discussed in Bandura’s 1986 book on social cognition theory (Bandura, 1986). 
 Bandura’s theory of self-efficacy (and collective efficacy) is key in 
understanding how to motivate individuals and groups of people to act on any 
major societal problem, including climate change. In a nutshell, the theory holds that 
individuals and groups are unlikely to attempt to act to solve a problem unless they 
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have a belief—a perceived sense of efficacy—that their individual and collective 
actions can make a difference, will help to solve the problem. The theory has 
particular relevance to climate change, because it is such a daunting problem. It is 
easy to become discouraged about climate change and feel that the problem is too 
great and that one person’s—or even one nation’s—action won’t make a significant 
difference. Those attempting to persuade people (and corporations, cities, states, 
and nations) to take action on climate change therefore must be mindful of self-
efficacy theory and communicate about climate change in ways that do not reduce 
their audience’s sense of self-efficacy and collective efficacy. 
 Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement also has great relevance to climate 
change, although this theory has thus far received less attention from climate 
activists and communicators. The theory is perfectly summed up in his Moral 
Disengagement book’s subtitle—How Good People Can Do Harm and Feel Good About 
Themselves. Moral-disengagement theory posits that people generally engage in self-
regulatory behavior to avoid doing harm to others and to live up to their moral 
standards. But as Bandura has shown, people can and do use a variety of 
mechanisms to turn off—disengage—their moral standards. This allows them to do 
harm—sometimes great harm—while still believing they are living up to their moral 
standards.   
 Bandura ends his Moral Disengagement book with a chapter about the 
environment and climate change. He makes clear his concern, calling climate change 
“the most urgent problem of the century,” and adding “the remarkable thing about 
the global warming problem is the low sense of urgency to abate it” (Bandura, 
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2016)(398). In the epilogue Bandura notes that while we have made some progress 
in “switching from fossil fuels to clean energy” we have failed to curb “wasteful, 
excessive consumption,” and indeed that problem is “worsening” (Bandura, 2016) 
(445). 
 This paper argues that giving full consideration and proper balance to each of 
Bandura’s two theories discussed here—self-efficacy and moral disengagement—
can help to improve the effectiveness of climate-change communication. That 
proper balance would have more emphasis on moral arguments and moral 
disengagement, a topic that today is largely absent from climate-communication 
efforts (with Laudato Si’ being a notable exception). Increased awareness of moral 
disengagement might in turn lead to an altered and improved understanding of self-
efficacy and collective efficacy as they apply to climate change.  
 I also argue that climate communicators, climate activists, and environmental 
groups, in battling moral disengagement and making the case that climate change is 
indeed a profound moral issue we cannot ignore, would do well to consult a rich and 
growing body of sociological research pertaining to environmental issues and 
climate change. That research sheds light on the scale and scope of climate change’s 
societal causes and effects and how to address them.  
Discussion  
 Albert Bandura 
 Albert Bandura is a towering figure in the field of psychology. His life story is 
itself an example of self-efficacy and moral engagement. Born in 1926, he grew up in 
rural Alberta, the son of Eastern European immigrants who had no formal education 
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(Foster, 2006).  After getting an undergraduate degree in psychology at the 
University of British Columbia, Bandura came to the United States for graduate 
school at the University of Iowa. After getting his Ph.D. there, he arrived at Stanford 
in 1953 with a one-year appointment as an acting instructor, and never left 
(Zimmerman & Schunk, 2003). Today he is the David Starr Jordan Professor, 
Emeritus, in the School of Humanities and Sciences. 
 Bandura published his most recent book, Moral Disengagement, in 2016, 
shortly after his 90th birthday. Last year he also received the National Medal of 
Science, the nation’s highest scientific honor, which is rarely awarded to social 
scientists (Clay, 2016). In a statement shortly after President Obama announced the 
medal award, Stanford’s president, John Hennessy, said that Bandura’s “lifetime of 
work in learning how we can understand and change behavior has been 
instrumental in helping people around the world lead healthier, more productive 
and more peaceful lives” (Lovell, 2015).  
Self-Efficacy 
 Bandura’s 1997 book Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control, does not mention 
climate change, but reading it twenty years after publication, one can easily discern 
self-efficacy theory’s applicability to the climate crisis. Bandura’s key insight with 
self-efficacy theory is that “[p]eople will approach, explore, and try to manage 
situations within their perceived capabilities, but unless they are externally coerced, 
they avoid transactions with those aspects of their environment that they perceive 
exceed their coping abilities.” A key word in that sentence is “perceived.” It is not 
just people’s abilities that affect their performance in life, but also their perception of 
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their abilities—their belief that addressing an issue is within their individual and 
collective capabilities.  
 “People’s beliefs in their efficacy affect almost everything they do: how they 
think, motivate themselves, feel, and behave” (Bandura, 1997)(14, 19). And just as 
an individual must have perceived self-efficacy to take action to address a problem, 
the same is true with individuals working in groups, in a process Bandura calls 
“collective efficacy.” Collective efficacy is closely related but not identical to self-
efficacy. As Bandura puts it, “[a] collection of inveterate self-doubters is not easily 
forged into a collectively efficacious force,” but “a collection of supremely efficacious 
individuals may perform poorly as a unit if they do not work well together” 
(Bandura, 1997)(480). Moreover, “individuals with high levels of collective efficacy 
living in communities where others also generally have high levels of collective 
efficacy” are likely to accomplish more than similar efficacious individuals living in 
communities where others have lower levels of collective efficacy (Thaker, Maibach, 
Leiserowitz, Zhao, & Howe, 2016)(30).  
 In Self-Efficacy’s last sentence Bandura says: “The times call for social 
initiatives that build people’s sense of collective efficacy to influence the conditions 
that shape their lives and those of future generations” (Bandura, 1997)(525). That 
20-year-old call to action to build people’s perceived collective efficacy is all the 
more pertinent today as we face the growing climate crisis. 
 Environmental groups and others are attempting to build a climate 
movement big enough and powerful enough to push the United States and the world 
to take effective action to sharply reduce climate-disrupting greenhouse-gas 
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emissions. Progress has been slow at best, and under any circumstances making the 
necessary global energy transition would be daunting. On top of that there is a 
powerful climate change countermovement, funded by conservative think tanks and 
fossil fuel interests, that disseminates climate-science disinformation and works to 
block or delay the transition from fossil fuels to clean energy (Brulle, 2014; Dunlap 
& Jacques, 2013; Dunlap & McCright, 2015; Farrell, 2016a, 2016b; M. E. Mann & 
Toles, 2016; Oreskes & Conway, 2011). The times do indeed call for building 
people’s individual and collective sense of efficacy “to influence the conditions that 




 Perhaps in part because Bandura’s work on moral disengagement was 
published more recently, it is less widely known than his self-efficacy theory, both 
as a general concept and in relation to climate change.1 Bandura told me, however, 
that he expects that to change. His research on self-efficacy, culminating in his book 
of that name, led to an explosion of research by others, with whole books devoted to 
the issues raised in each of the chapters in the book Self-Efficacy (Bandura, 2017). 
Bandura expects something similar will happen in coming years with moral-
disengagement theory, because, he told me, in his Moral Disengagement book “there 
virtually is no social system that is not being indicted. And so I expect that it’s going 
                                                        
1 A Google Scholar search for the term “moral disengagement” yielded 9,840 results 
on February 22, 2017. A search for “self-efficacy” yielded 1.57 million results. With 
the term “climate change” added to these two searches, “moral disengagement and 
climate change” yielded 392 results, while “self-efficacy and climate change yielded 
12,200.” 
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to be creating the same kind of widespread application as Self-Efficacy did” 
(Bandura, 2017). 
 The key to understanding moral disengagement, how it works, and why it is 
important, is to know that “affective self-sanctions are the major mechanism by 
which people come to live in accordance with their moral standards” (Bandura, 
2016)(27)(emphasis added). But, Bandura explains, “[m]any psychosocial 
maneuvers can be used to disengage moral self-sanctions from inhumane conduct. 
Selective activation and disengagement of self-sanctions permits different types of 
conduct by persons with the same moral standards.” Thus, “[m]oral disengagement 
does not alter moral standards. Rather, it provides the means for those who morally 
disengage to circumvent moral standards in ways that strip morality from harmful 
behavior and their responsibility for it” (Bandura, 2016)(2, 3).   
 Moral disengagement has obvious applicability to explaining how people can 
participate in (or be silent bystanders to) great crimes and atrocities, such as the 
Holocaust and other genocides, while still being kind and considerate to others in  
their daily lives. But Bandura notes that the concept is not limited to such extreme 
circumstances: “In point of fact, [moral disengagement] is common in all types of 
moral predicaments managed by ordinary people in all walks of everyday life.” 
Indeed, “by late adolescence, children have learned the full array of disengagement 
practices” (Bandura, 2016)(1, 34).  
 Bandura identifies eight mechanisms that people (or organizations) use to 
disengage their conduct from their moral standards (Bandura, 2016)(49-91). Each 
of the eight is applied at one of four places (the behavior locus, the agency locus, the 
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outcome locus, and the victim locus) along the line between harmful behavior or 
conduct (detrimental practices) and the harmful effects that conduct has on people 
(victims), as shown in the figure below: 
 
 
 All eight of these disengagement mechanisms are frequently used to slow or 
block humanity’s response to climate change. I list Bandura’s eight categories here, 
with an example or two of each mechanism at work with regard to climate change. 
In many instances, people or organizations combine two or more of these 
mechanisms in their efforts to justify continued fossil-fuel use or to oppose action to 
reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. 
(1) Moral, Social and Economic Justifications 
 In this mechanism of moral disengagement, people convince themselves that 
their harmful conduct is in fact moral, socially good, and economically beneficial. 
Bandura calls this “sanctifying” a particular practice, “a generic term for diverse 
ways of justifying the rightness of harmful practices” (Bandura, 2016)(49). It is 
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quite easy to see this technique at work regarding climate change, where the 
primary culprit is carbon-dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels. People and 
organizations hoping to delay or block action to reduce carbon emissions simply 
talk up the undeniable benefits of fossil-fuel energy use, while ignoring, minimizing, 
or denying altogether the harmful consequences of the resulting emissions. They do 
this while also ignoring that non-emitting alternatives are available, or overstating 
the costs or understating the feasibility of those alternative clean-energy sources.  
 Some have gone so far as to say that the moral good of burning fuels 
outweighs the harm caused by the resulting carbon emissions. Bjorn Lomborg, who 
has received substantial funding from climate countermovement sources, has 
argued that global warming will be good and that fossil fuels are needed for the 
world’s poorest people (Caney, 2010; Lomborg, 2007; Readfearn, 2014, 2015). 
Similarly, Calvin Beisner of the Cornwall Alliance has argued, in critiquing Pope 
Francis’s Laudato Si’, that increased carbon dioxide is good for the world and 
people, and that reducing fossil fuel use will trap poor people in poverty (Beisner, 
2015). The Cornwall Alliance is linked to fossil-fuel interests and conservative 
groups (Romm, 2010b). 
(2) Euphemistic Language  
 Euphemisms are often put to work to downplay the harm that carbon-
dioxide and other greenhouse-gas emissions cause to the climate, or to hide the true 
purpose of groups opposed to climate action. The expression “clean coal” is a 
commonly used euphemism, used to divert attention from the fact that coal is the 
most carbon-intensive fossil fuel. For example, coal-burning utilities tout how much 
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their harmful “emissions” have been reduced at a power plant by pollution control 
devices such as mercury scrubbers, while simply ignoring the fact that these devices 
do nothing to reduce the plant’s carbon-dioxide emissions. Or they build coal power 
plants that are “carbon-capture ready,” ignoring the fact that the plant will be 
burning coal for many years or decades before carbon-capture techniques will be 
installed, if indeed they ever are (Hamilton, 2013).  
 Many fossil-fuel industry front groups have euphemistic names, belying their 
mission to block climate action and promote carbon emissions. Examples include 
the American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity, and an organization called Friends 
of Science that disseminates climate-science disinformation (Milnes & Haney, 2017; 
Plait, 2014). The anodyne- and vaguely academic-sounding Center for the Study of 
Carbon Dioxide and Global Change similarly disseminates science disinformation, 
and is funded by, among others, a foundation affiliated with the Koch brothers, 
major shareholders in Koch Industries, a large fossil-fuel company. Bandura 
identifies the use of industry front groups as a specific example of a moral-
disengagement technique employed to enable environmental harms (Bandura, 
2007, 2016) (21)(13). 
 
(3) Advantageous Comparison 
 “Self-exoneration by advantageous comparison with more flagrant 
inhumanities is a … mechanism for cloaking [harmful] behavior in an aura of 
benevolence”(Bandura, 2016). Any parent of young children is familiar with the 
technique (although, one hopes, in connection with lesser evils than 
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“inhumanities”). The point of course is that people often excuse their own harmful 
conduct by pointing to others whose conduct is (really, or supposedly) worse. This 
can be seen in the climate context with individual behavior, corporate behavior, and 
even the conduct of nations. At the individual level, one can attempt to justify one’s 
carbon footprint attributable to wasteful consumption or excessive driving or flying 
by pointing to others who consume more, drive bigger cars, or fly more often. At the 
corporate level, an electric utility can attempt to justify its building new natural gas-
fired power plants (while working to delay wind and solar power) by pointing to 
other utilities that burn more coal, or that have higher rates of carbon intensity in 
their power production. 
 Bandura sees advantageous comparison at work in how some in the United 
States attempted to justify the nation’s failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the 
1990s. Those in the U.S. opposed to ratification justified their recalcitrance by 
pointing to how the agreement would place stricter requirements on the U.S. than 
on China and India. Those two countries and others in the Global South, in turn, 
pointed out that the U.S. and other Western nations were responsible for most of the 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. “And so both sides felt self-righteous. They used 
comparative justification and both felt self-righteous” (Bandura, 2017) (Bandura, 
2016)(397).  
(4) Displacement of Responsibility 
 With this moral-disengagement mechanism, those doing harm obscure or 
minimize their “agentive role in causing harm” (Bandura, 2016)(58). With climate 
change, this is easily seen in the way that fossil-fuel companies use front groups to 
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do much of their dirty work in fighting efforts to reduce carbon emissions. We saw 
examples of this at work in the above discussion of euphemistic language. The 
euphemisms are used to conceal the true purposes of the groups’ anti-climate work. 
But using front groups in the first instance is done to provide those who fund them 
with some distance—“displacement of responsibility”—from the work being done. 
A term from the Watergate era aptly describes the concept—maintaining “plausible 
deniability.” Thus, for example, a business can claim to be a good corporate citizen 
and environmental steward, while still supporting the American Legislative 
Exchange Council (ALEC), which works behind the scenes to promote climate-
science disinformation to state legislators (Heald, 2014, 2016b). 
 Some individuals and corporations have used intermediary organizations 
known as “donor directed funds” such as Donors Trust to conceal their funding of 
climate denial front groups. This provides yet another layer of displacement on top 
of euphemistic names and the use of the front groups themselves. The sociologist 
Robert Brulle published a detailed analysis of how this disengagement mechanism 
has funneled hundreds of millions of dollars from unknown sources to organizations 
that promote climate-science denial (Brulle, 2014). 
 
(5) Diffusion of Responsibility 
 Closely related to displacement of responsibility is diffusion of responsibility. 
“Any harm done by a group can always be attributed largely to the behavior of 
others” (Bandura, 2016)(62). That is perhaps nowhere more true than in the case of 
climate change, which is the result primarily of more than a century of 
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industrialization in the Western nations, a system most of us in the U.S. were born 
into, through no fault of our own. One can thus absolve oneself, if one is so inclined, 
of individual blame for our current climate predicament. On the other hand, 
President Lyndon Johnson was briefed on the problem of anthropogenic global 
warming over 50 years ago, and for at least 25 years we’ve known we need to 
decarbonize our economy, but have done far too little to achieve that.  
(6) Disregard, Distortion, and Denial of Harmful Effects 
 This is perhaps the best known, and also most effective moral-
disengagement mechanism that has been used to prolong and exonerate our 
nation’s inaction in addressing climate change. Climate-science denial is the epitome 
of moral disengagement. The role of conservative think tanks and the fossil-fuel 
industry in funding and promoting climate-science denial has been documented in 
considerable detail (Brulle, 2014; Dunlap & Jacques, 2013; Dunlap & McCright, 
2015; Farrell, 2016a, 2016b; Oreskes & Conway, 2011). Former ExxonMobil CEO 
Rex Tillerson, now the U.S. Secretary of State, demonstrated moral disengagement 
when he downplayed climate change harms by saying that the risks are “overblown” 
and we can simply adapt to the changing climate (Associated Press, 2012; Mooney, 
2016).  
 In time, corporate- and conservative think tank-funded climate-science 
denial, and our society’s tolerance of it, will come to be seen as one of the greatest 
moral failures in American history. This denial campaign has caused and will cause 
incalculable suffering around the world. As the climate scientist Michael Mann has 
noted, “history should not be allowed to forget” who the climate-science deniers are 
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and what they have done, but “history will be too late” (M. E. Mann & Toles, 
2016)(115). 
(7) Dehumanization 
 Bandura’s last two disengagement mechanisms focus on the victims of  
harmful conduct. Eventually, of course, climate change will harm all of humanity. We 
and our descendants all are or will be victims. But the first to suffer, and those least 
equipped to adapt to or survive the disruptions of climate change, are chiefly poor 
and vulnerable people, most of whom live far away, largely in the Global South. 
Because of their low-consumption, low-emission lifestyles, they also happen to be 
the people least responsible for the climate crisis. As an example of the 
dehumanization moral-disengagement mechanism, Bandura cites what he calls a 
“self-centered” opinion column by the prominent climate-science denier Myron 
Ebell (Bandura, 2016)(414). Ebell touted supposed benefits of climate change in 
northern climes and ignored the effects on what Bandura calls “vulnerable others” 
(Ebell, 2006) (Bandura, 2016)(414). Naomi Klein has explicitly linked such 
“othering” views about the Global South (a concept devised by Edward Said) to both 
the causes of climate change and the world’s failure to respond appropriately to 
mitigate it (Klein, 2016; Said, 1979).  
 Under the best of circumstances (that is, even without corporate-funded 
climate-science denial) it is difficult for many Americans to imagine how climate 
change is and will be affecting poor people on the other side of the world, whose 
lives are very different from ours. But Bandura notes that that is what we must do to 
counter moral disengagement. We must see such people as fellow human beings 
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(“seeing common humanity in others”) who are and will be suffering, in large part 
because of our high-consumption, high-emission Western lifestyles. “One of the 
most striking findings of research on the suspension of morality is the extraordinary 
power of humanization to curb inhumane practices” (Bandura, 2016)(446). 
 
(8) Attribution of Blame 
 Bandura’s eighth disengagement mechanism involves shifting the blame 
from perpetrator to victim, as a way to allow one to continue harmful conduct while 
exonerating oneself from responsibility for that conduct. We saw this at work in the 
discussion above about those in the U.S. government who opposed the Kyoto 
Protocol because it imposed stronger greenhouse-gas reductions on developed 
nations than on developing nations, and blamed developing nations for this. Many in 
the U.S. simply refused to acknowledge their nation’s historical role in causing the 
climate crisis, while looking to others to shoulder the major burden of addressing it. 
A recent study interviewing men in Calgary, where the economy is highly dependent 
on oil extraction from the Alberta tar sands, found that men (but not women) 
tended to both deny that climate change is human-caused, while also pointing to 
China and India as places where (they contend) it makes more sense to work to 
reduce carbon emissions (Milnes & Haney, 2017). The men held fast to their 
climate-contrarian views despite Calgary having recently experienced devastating 
flooding likely attributable to climate change. The disparity found between men and 
women aligns with Bandura’s observation that by adolescence boys are generally 





 Before turning to how self-efficacy and moral disengagement may be related 
to America’s climate silence, I discuss what I mean by “silence.” As noted above, 
Maibach and colleagues have demonstrated that few Americans hear about global 
warming regularly in the media or in everyday conversation, and 68 percent of 
Americans rarely or never discuss the issue with family or friends (Maibach et al., 
2016). This becomes a spiral of silence as people, not hearing much about climate 
change, pick up a societal signal that talk about climate change is not normal or 
desirable. Although not referring specifically to climate change, the sociologist 
Eviatar Zerubavel, in his slim book The Elephant in the Room: Silence and Denial in 
Everyday Life, refers to such a spiral of silence as a “conspiracy of silence, whereby a 
group of people tacitly agree to outwardly ignore something of which they are all 
personally aware…” (Zerubavel, 2007)(2).  
 The “socially constructed silence” surrounding climate change hinders action 
on mitigation and adaptation, because “interpersonal communication about topics is 
crucial to build support for social change…” (Geiger & Swim, 2016). Zerubavel 
explains that “[b]y enabling ... collective denial, conspiracies of silence prevent us 
from confronting, and consequently solving, our problems” (Zerubavel, 2007)(87).  
He considers silence on an issue to be a form of communication that “often speaks 
louder than words” and that involves “a deliberate effort to refrain from noticing...” 
(Zerubavel, 2007)(8-9).  
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 Although Zerubavel never mentions climate change in his book, he makes a 
point that seems particularly apt in the case of some types of climate silence: 
“[Silence] usually involves refusing to acknowledge the presence of things that 
actually beg for attention, thereby reminding us that conspiracies of silence revolve 
not around those largely unnoticeable matters we simply overlook, but, on the 
contrary, around those highly conspicuous matters we deliberately try to avoid.” 
(Zerubavel, 2007)(9). No doubt much of the climate silence in America does involve 
people who truly don’t think about climate change and truly overlook it, or don’t 
notice it. Certainly corporate-funded climate-science denial has greatly increased 
the number of such people. 
 But another form of silence involves people and organizations who do think 
and talk about climate change a good deal, but fail to include certain aspects and 
implications of the problem in their discussions. And the aspects and implications 
that often are excluded from the conversation tend to be the more disturbing and 
problematic implications of our climate predicament. The late sociologist Stanley 
Cohen, in his classic study of denial and silence, States of Denial: Knowing about 
Atrocities and Suffering, called this sort of partial silence “implicatory denial,” where 
“information is selected to fit existing perceptual frames and information which is 
too threatening is shut out altogether” (Cohen, 2001)(5-9). The sociologist Kari 
Norgaard found Cohen’s implicatory denial to be present in many discussions of 
climate change. The presence of such implicatory denial can manifest itself in 
climate silence, including silence about climate change’s moral aspects. “What is 
minimized [i.e., not discussed, or rarely discussed] is not information itself, ‘but the 
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psychological, political or moral implications that conventionally follow’” (Norgaard, 
2011)(10-11), quoting (Cohen, 2001)(8).  
 So in analyzing climate silence I use a broader definition of “silence” than the 
obvious instance of not talking about climate change at all. Climate silence can be 
more subtle than that, yet equally or perhaps more damaging. It can include 
environmentalists talking only about “clean energy,” or “jobs,” or “clean air,” while 
avoiding any mention of climate change. It can include talking about climate impacts 
such as extreme flooding and heat waves, but limiting the discussion to those 
impacts here in the U.S.  Such limited discussion excludes mention of climate-change 
impacts on the world’s poorest people in the Global South, where it is likely that far 
more people are and will be suffering and dying from climate-change impacts. 
Partial climate silence can include talking about climate adaptation or resilience, 
while studiously avoiding mentioning the greenhouse-gas emissions that cause 
climate change, and how to reduce those emissions. It can also include talking about 
“adaptation” and “resilience” without mentioning what it is we are adapting to or 
working to be resilient from. The climate blogger Joe Romm has been calling out 
climate silence for years, and gives other examples (Romm, 2009, 2010a, 2011, 
2016).  
 Once one becomes aware of the various manifestations of these broader 
forms of climate silence, and thinks to look (or listen) for them, they are quite easy 
to spot. You can find them almost anywhere. Thus, for example, I noted last year that 
in two utility executives’ speeches to business groups, where climate-change effects 
were very much part of the topic, the executives studiously avoided mentioning 
 20 
climate change itself (Heald, 2016c). I found a similar dancing around the topic of 
climate change in a recent series of articles in the Newport News Daily Press, which 
addressed the effects of sea-level rise, but avoided linking those effects to global 
warming, or even mentioning global warming or climate change at all (Heald, 2017). 
A professor at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Va. noticed this form of climate 
circumlocution in his threatened coastal city’s planning document for the next 
century. The “Norfolk Vision 2100” plan discussed “learning to live with the water” 
and “resiliency,” but failed to mention global warming or climate change and their 
role in causing the waters to rise (Allen, 2016). 
 Failure to see (and name and discuss) climate change as a moral or social-
justice issue is itself a form of implicatory climate silence. The philosopher Dale 
Jamieson noted a decade ago that moral arguments rarely come up when climate 
change is discussed: “The language of morality is the language of care, empathy, 
responsibility, and duty. This language has largely been absent from discussions of 
climate change. Instead the language of science, economics, and technological 
development has been dominant” (Jamieson, 2007)(481). This is consistent with the 
recent finding that most Americans think of climate change as an environmental, 
scientific, and economic issue, while most fail to see it as a moral, poverty, social 
justice, or religious issue (Leiserowitz et al., 2017). 
 Even Bernie Sanders has been guilty of a subtle form of implicatory climate 
silence. He was widely (and correctly) acknowledged to be the strongest climate 
champion among the major U.S. presidential contenders. But as Grist’s Ben Adler 
pointed out, both Sanders and Hillary Clinton avoided any discussion during the 
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campaign of U.S. efforts to help the poorer nations of the Global South deal with 
climate change. When Adler pressed both campaigns for comment on that silence, 
both failed to respond (i.e., more silence). Adler speculated why the two Democrats 
avoided the topic: 
That may have something to do with the fact that—unlike raising the 
minimum wage or improving college affordability—this issue is a 
political loser. What’s the constituency for international climate justice 
in the U.S., especially among swing voters? How many disengaged 
young people can be dragged to the polls by the promise of paying for 
sea walls and solar panels in Bangladesh? A big climate finance 
proposal would be a ripe target for Republicans to attack, with little 
political upside. But our political conversation about climate change 
isn’t really serious unless climate finance is a part of it (Adler, 2016). 
 
 No doubt Adler’s speculation about the two campaigns’ reasons for avoiding 
the topic is correct. And he is surely (and sadly) correct that discussing climate 
justice for the world’s poor during the 2016 presidential campaign would have had 
“little political upside.” That was particularly true for Democratic candidates, 
inasmuch as the leading candidates in the Republican party were employing the 
moral-disengagement technique of climate-science denial, superimposed on most or 
all of the other seven moral-disengagement methods. But Adler is also correct that 
climate discussions that avoid worldwide climate justice are not fully and seriously 
addressing the problem of climate change. 
 I’ve noticed a similar form of climate silence among many U.S. environmental 
groups. In recent years these groups, to their credit, have increased their focus on 
environmental justice, noting that, in the U.S., minority and low-income populations 
suffer a disproportionate share of environmental harms. The focus on 
environmental and climate justice increased significantly after Hurricane Katrina, 
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which demonstrated graphically how climate impacts can and will especially harm 
the most vulnerable Americans. But most big U.S. environmental groups still avoid 
discussing climate impacts on, or climate justice for, the world’s poorest people in 
the Global South, just as Sanders and Clinton did in their campaigns. This is a form of 
silence, and also of moral disengagement. 
 Examples of this partial silence can be found in discussion of environmental 
justice on the websites of the National Resources Defense Council and Sierra Club 
(“Environmental Justice,” n.d., “The Environmental Justice Movement,” n.d.). A 
notable exception to this partial silence among U.S.-based environmental 
organizations is the relatively small Catholic Climate Covenant. Inspired by Catholic 
social teaching and in particular Laudato Si’, it frequently points out the adverse 
effects of climate change on the world’s poorest people, and the moral imperative to 
address climate change (Catholic Climate Covenant, 2015; “Resources - 
Environmental Justice,” n.d.). 
 Another, related form of climate silence is avoiding discussion of the need for 
Americans (and residents of other wealthy, developed nations) to make sacrifices in 
their high-consumption, consumerist lifestyles in order to address climate change 
(Dauvergne, 2016)(147). Few U.S. environmental groups and climate 
communicators ever mention that Americans need to make significant reductions in 
consumption in order to address climate change. Instead these groups use a more 
upbeat message, focused primarily on more clean energy, with talk of benefits such 
as jobs and clean air. 
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 This discrepancy or tension between what climate activists say and what 
may actually need to be done to address the climate problem surfaced in the 2016 
climate-change documentary film Before The Flood. In the movie Leonardo DiCaprio 
interviews the Indian environmental scholar and activist Sunita Narain, but cannot 
accept her argument (which she has been making for more than 25 years) that 
westerners will have to reduce their consumption in the face of climate change 
(Agarwal & Narain, 1991). Narain tells DiCaprio, “I’m sorry to say this to you, as an 
American, but your consumption is really going to put a hole in the planet. We need 
to put the issue of lifestyle and consumption at the centre of climate negotiations.” 
DiCaprio declines to engage Narain’s point substantively, instead saying he thinks 
Americans are unlikely to reduce consumption, and so the solution must consist of 
simply shifting to clean energy. Narain sadly shakes her head (York, 2016). 
 Another example of this form of climate silence can be found in the American 
reception of the novelist Amitav Ghosh’s 2016 deeply thoughtful climate-change 
book The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable. Ghosh is an 
acclaimed writer whose works of fiction have been widely reviewed and read in the 
U.S.  Published in America by The University of Chicago Press, The Great 
Derangement has highly original arguments linking climate change’s causes back to 
colonialism and pointing out that much climate change discussion is Eurocentric 
and avoids the issue of reducing consumption in the West. Despite Ghosh’s renown, 
the book seems to have garnered little attention in the U.S., and was not reviewed in 
The New York Times, where a review would have brought it a much wider 
readership. 
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 Bandura leaves no doubt that he considers U.S. overconsumption to be a big 
part of the climate-change problem, and that addressing it is a moral issue (Bandura, 
2016)(376, 385). He notes three major areas that need to be addressed concerning 
climate change: (1) shifting energy production away from fossil fuels, (2) slowing 
population growth, and (3) “curbing wasteful, excessive consumption” (Bandura, 
2016)(445). He sees “some progress” being made on the first two and told me he is 
optimistic about them. But he notes that efforts to address the third area, 
consumption, are “not only failing but … worsening” (Bandura, 2016, 2017).  
 Of course Pope Francis is a notable exception to the general silence on moral 
issues surrounding climate change. Especially in his encyclical, Laudato Si’, but also 
in his speeches and travels, he has drawn attention to climate impacts on the 
world’s poor, and connected climate change to overconsumption (“throwaway 
cultures”) in wealthier nations (Heald, 2016a). But in the U.S. the pope’s climate 
message has generally not been fully embraced by the church leadership or 
congregations, and a majority of white U.S. Catholics voted for climate-science 
denier Donald Trump (Annett, 2016; Heald, 2016a).  
 A few U.S. environmental leaders have spoken out about our 
overconsumption and its climate impacts on the world’s poor in the Global South. 
These include Bill McKibben, Naomi Klein (who is Canadian but active in the U.S.), 
David Orr, and James Gustave Speth (Klein, 2014, 2016; Orr, 2016; Speth, 2009, 
2012). But the larger, better-funded environmental groups have done this far less, 
sticking safely to more upbeat messaging about clean energy. 
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 There is likely another factor that facilitates moral disengagement by 
downplaying the most harmful climate impacts. That is the general inclination on 
the part of most people, and particularly Americans, to be positive about things, to 
assume that all will be okay, because that is how things usually work out for many in 
America today. Kari Norgaard has observed pressure to “keep things positive” in 
connection with climate change, the “perceived need to be hopeful. Not just 
perceived need but social norm” (Norgaard, 2011)(101). 
 Clive Hamilton has sharply criticized pressure to be optimistic about climate 
change, noting that a positive attitude can easily slip over the line into wishful 
thinking, which he says has been implicated in “history’s great acts of 
unpreparedness” (Hamilton, 2013)(105-05). David Orr makes the same point about 
what he calls “undue optimism”: 
So the typical response to being told the facts of climate 
destabilization is to dismiss them because they are too depressing, as 
if science must be commensurate with one’s preferred emotional state 
and perpetual fun were a Constitutional right. Heaven forbid that 
anything should ever be depressing even when it is. The possibility 
that we have brought on for ourselves and our descendants a long run 
of climate-change-driven catastrophes is as indigestible as a rock. 
 
 Accordingly those who persist about telling the truth about 
climate change are admonished to be more positive and talk only 
about the many opportunities in the green economy.  The line 
between optimism and delusion is often fuzzy. 
 
(Orr, 2016)(41) 
 Orr adds that Martin Luther King “didn’t soft-pedal the truth about lynchings, 
beatings and discrimination. If he had, the fierce urgency of now would have been a 
lot less fierce, urgent and memorable” (Orr, 2016)(42-43). Speth makes the same 
point: “one still hears with regularity that it is a mistake to stress these gloomy and 
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doomy realities if one wants to motivate people. … But… [w]e need to be reminded 
of the nightmare ahead…. [W]e will never do the things that are needed unless we 
know the full extent of our predicament” (Speth, 2009)(233-34).  
 
Analysis 
 Analyzing Bandura’s self-efficacy and moral-disengagement theories 
together, as they pertain to climate change, is instructive in understanding the 
reasons for climate silence as well as possible ways to reduce that silence and build 
a stronger climate movement. My argument has five elements: 
 (1) Environmental groups and climate communicators, understandably 
concerned about their audience’s sense of self-efficacy and collective efficacy with 
respect to climate change, tend to emphasize positive clean-energy solutions, 
focusing much less on (a) the serious harmful human impacts of climate change, and 
(b) the need for reducing consumption, not as an alternative to clean energy, but as 
a necessary supplement to it. And when they do focus on harmful human climate 
impacts, they do so far more on domestic U.S. impacts, rather than the more 
imminent and dangerous impacts on the world’s poorest people. 
 (2) Making strong moral arguments for climate action, and strong arguments 
against moral disengagement, necessarily requires both (1) considerable focus on 
harmful human climate impacts, particularly in the Global South, and (2) 
considerable focus on the need to reduce consumption in the U.S. in addition to 
making the necessary transition to clean energy.  
 27 
 (3) Climate silence, both complete silence and the partial, implicatory silence 
of the sort described above, is both a cause and symptom of moral disengagement, 
and a perceived lack of self-efficacy and collective efficacy concerning how to 
address climate change. 
 (4) Effective climate messaging, and building an effective climate movement, 
thus requires both building self-efficacy and collective efficacy, while also being 
candid about the worldwide moral implications of climate change, calling out moral 
disengagement and implicatory silence, and encouraging moral engagement on the 
issue. 
 (5) And finally, building self-efficacy and collective efficacy must be focused 
on the type of efficacy needed for the task at hand (which necessarily will include 
battles against moral disengagement), and efforts to rein in our consumerist, high-
consumption, growth-focused culture. An essential part of this involves building a 
sense of efficacy to challenge what has come to be known as neoliberalism.  
  It is tempting to soft-pedal harmful climate-change impacts and implications 
in the interest of remaining hopeful and positive. The impacts and implications of 
climate change have always been disturbing, particularly if one thinks honestly and 
deeply about them. Our nation’s and the world’s failure to address the issue with the 
necessary honesty and urgency over the past 30 years is itself disturbing. One can 
easily understand why many Americans are silent about climate in whole or in part, 
and prefer to look the other way and carry on with ordinary daily life.  
 It is also tempting to downplay or deny the need for reduction in American 
consumption levels, because stressing that need is a tough sell to the American 
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people. It is made all the tougher (as with everything else about addressing climate 
change) by well-funded climate-science denial that suggests the problem is 
overblown or entirely imaginary. Related to the consumption issue is capitalism 
itself, particularly in its currently dominant neoliberal form. Market fundamentalism 
and near-worship of business and economic growth exert a strong influence on 
American culture and politics. The sociologists Riley Dunlap and Aaron McCright 
convincingly demonstrate that neoliberal ideology is a strong force behind the 
denialist countermovement that manufactures purported doubt and uncertainty 
about climate science (Dunlap & McCright, 2015). 
 As a result of neoliberalism’s dominance, any discussion of the role that 
capitalism, economic growth, and neoliberalism play in the climate crisis is “nearly 
taboo.” Only some of the most left-leaning environmental leaders and thinkers, Pope 
Francis, and some in academia, especially sociology, have addressed those 
connectons (Dunlap & Brulle, 2015; McCright & Dunlap, 2010)(430). The Indian 
scholar and activist Sunita Narain and her co-author Chandra Bhushan also note the 
taboo on discussing U.S. (and other nations’) consumption, saying “The C-word is 
the C-word” (Narain & Bhushan, 2015)(vii). 
 Building self and collective efficacy for any difficult task is daunting. And 
climate change is likely the greatest collective challenge civilization has ever faced 
(Beck, 2016)(36) (Conover, n.d.) (Hamilton, 2013)(210-211, 215, 219)  (Orr, 
2016)(24, 42) (Ghosh, 2016)(12). For Americans in 2017 the task at hand has 
grown all the more daunting with a new president who has called climate change a 
Chinese hoax and has appointed a new Environmental Protection Agency 
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administrator, Scott Pruitt, who denies climate science and has filled top agency 
positions with likeminded colleagues (Davenport, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; Wong, 
2016). 
 It is tempting to cope with the enormous climate-change task at hand by 
scaling it down to match our perceived individual and collective efficacies. Kari 
Norgaard suggests that that has happened with some people (Norgaard, 2011)(68, 
73). But Bandura warns that for self-efficacy and collective to succeed in addressing 
a problem, there has to be efficacy for the proper task at hand.  (Bandura, 1997)(64, 
66). Stated another way, it won’t do to adjust the climate-change task at hand down 
to an individual’s, or a society’s, perceived sense of efficacy. What has to be done is 
to assess honestly and accurately the task at hand, and then build self and collective 
efficacy for that task.  
 There are certainly good reasons, as a matter of effective communications 
strategy, not to be negative all the time, or to dump too much negative information 
on an audience in one sitting. It is easy to become overwhelmed by the details and 
implications of climate change. So climate communicators should know their 
audience, and avoid overwhelming it. A new study suggests that moral arguments 
about climate change effects on the world’s poorest people, such as those Pope 
Francis asserted in his speeches and in Laudato Si’, may be most effective on people 
who are already concerned about climate change (Myers, Roser-Renouf, Maibach, & 
Leiserowitz, 2017). This is important, because building a strong climate movement 
is not merely about persuading more people to become concerned about climate 
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change. It is also requires persuading those who are already concerned to take 
action (or stronger action).  
 I asked Bandura about what I see as the tension between self-efficacy and 
moral disengagement when addressing climate change. On the one hand, self-
efficacy theory emphasizes the importance of avoiding hopelessness and despair. On 
the other hand, the instances of moral disengagement surrounding climate change 
need to be challenged vigorously. Making those challenges necessarily requires 
complete honesty in disclosing all the climate-change harms that are happening 
now and coming later in the century and beyond. As the late sociologist Stanley 
Cohen said, in his classic study of denial and silence, States of Denial: Knowing about 
Atrocities and Suffering: “Despite the complex obstacles between information and 
action—the entire subject of my book—no humanitarian, educational or political 
organization should even consider limiting its flow of knowledge” (Cohen, 
2001)(295). 
 In my discussion with Bandura, he acknowledged the enormity of the task at 
hand in addressing climate change. He agreed that it is essential to be candid about 
the scale and scope of the problem. But he said that self-efficacy and collective 
efficacy are still essential. To ensure adequate self and collective efficacy for a large 
task, the task has to be broken down into manageable subparts and all subparts 
must then be addressed (Bandura, 1997, 2017)(134-35, 219). But it is essential not 
to confuse the subtasks for the larger task itself.  
 In Self-Efficacy, Bandura notes that to address great social problems, proper 
efficacy requires people “willing to endure in pursuits strewn with obstacles and 
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uncertainties,” who will “persevere against tough odds.” Such people, he says, may 
encounter “social rejection,” which can “scare off the fainthearted.” Or they may be 
dismissed as “attention-seekers, or as self-deluded eccentrics doggedly pursuing ill-
conceived ideas.” Bandura concludes: “To paraphrase the astute observation of 
George Bernard Shaw, since reasonable people adapt to the world and unreasonable 
ones try to alter it, human progress depends on the unreasonable ones” (Bandura, 
1997)(71-72). All this well describes leaders of great social movements such as 
Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and American abolitionists in the 18th and 19th 
centuries.  And it well describes those leaders who have made strong moral 
arguments in favor of climate action, and have directly challenged the role of 
consumption, capitalism, and neoliberalism in causing climate change and blocking 
effective action to address it. Such leaders include Bill McKibben, Naomi Klein, Tim 
DeChristopher, and Pope Francis. Many of the larger, more mainstream, well-funded 
U.S. environmental groups and their leaders have been less willing to challenge 
neoliberalism, and especially unwilling to challenge economic growth, consumption, 
or capitalism. That reflects the “taboo” described by Dunlap and Brulle and Narain 
and Bhushan, but also represents a clear-eyed assessment of what seems politically 
possible in America today.  Limiting ourselves to what seems politically possible, in 
turn, brings to mind Bandura’s point (derived from George Bernard Shaw) that 
human progress depends on unreasonable people. 
 Bill McKibben is frequently called a radical. Certainly he and the 350.org 
group he founded are on the more left-leaning side of the diverse environmental 
groups in the U.S. He has defended himself from the “radical” charge with the 
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comment that those who deny climate science and propose to keep burning fossil 
fuels that change the atmosphere’s chemical composition are the real radicals 
(McKibben, 2016). To my knowledge no one has accused Bandura of being a radical, 
environmental or otherwise. His books are written in a somewhat dry, academic 
style. Although he is of course well known and revered in his discipline, he has not 
been associated with the environmental or climate movements.  
 On my first reading of Moral Disengagement I didn’t conclude that Bandura is 
an environmental radical. But when he told me, as noted above, “there virtually is no 
social system that is not being indicted” in the book, that caused me to think more 
deeply about the book, and re-read portions of it. In a dispassionate, scholarly way, 
Bandura’s Moral Disengagement links climate change to U.S. overconsumption, 
“excessive consumerism,” “unbridled economic self-interest,” “free-market 
principles,” “free-market fundamentalists,” and our “market-driven culture,” and 
stresses the need to make moral arguments against them (Bandura, 2016)(373, 376, 
395, 396). Bandura doesn’t use the word “neoliberalism,” but it is clearly 
encompassed by his use of the quoted words. In both his book and in his discussion 
with me, Bandura condemned the way we in the U.S. use Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) or Gross National Product (GNP) to measure our collective wealth and 
success, even referring in the interview to “the damn GNP,” meaning “the way we 
evaluate society. … And that’s the amount of junk you produce” (Bandura, 2016, 
2017). 
 Moral Disengagement’s environmental and climate arguments align Bandura 
squarely with the scholars, thinkers, and other writers who have been urging 
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Americans to focus on capitalism, economic growth, free-market fundamentalism, 
neoliberalism, consumerism, and overconsumption as both the root causes of 
climate change, and also the chief obstacles to addressing it with appropriate 
urgency. These scholars and writers include Robert Brulle, Amitav Ghosh, Clive 
Hamilton, Naomi Klein, the UCLA sociologist Michael Mann (not to be confused with 
the Penn State climate scientist of the same name), Bill McKibben, Sunita Narain, 
Kari Norgaard, David Orr, James Gustave Speth, and Pope Francis (Brulle, 2010; 
Brulle & Antonio, 2015; Hamilton, 2010, 2013, Klein, 2011, 2014; M. Mann, 2013; 
Narain & Bhushan, 2015; Norgaard, 2011; Orr, 2012, 2016, Speth, 2009, 2012). 
 Yet challenging our overconsumption, economic growth, or capitalism itself 
seems beyond the pale for most of the larger U.S. environmental organizations 
today, not to mention for American politicians. Any politician doing so would surely 
be called radical. Near the end of Merchants of Doubt, a history of corporate-funded 
science denialism, Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway explain how James Gustave 
Speth, who today is 75, came to be “radicalized” over the course of a long and 
distinguished environmental career: 
Consider the case of Gus Speth,  … a member of President Jimmy 
Carter’s Council on Environmental Quality, and an advocate for action 
against acid rain. Speth is no rock-throwing radical. Born in South 
Carolina, he is the consummate southern gentleman: well-spoken, 
well educated, well regarded.  As an undergraduate he attended Yale, 
went to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, and returned to Yale for law 
school. During his long career he taught at Yale and Georgetown, 
served as an advisor to President Carter, worked for the United 
Nations, and … returned to Yale once again as the dean of the School 
of Forestry and Environmental Studies. Time magazine once called 
him the “ultimate insider.”   
 
… Speth has become radicalized by the world’s failure to act on 
problems we have known about for a long time. He now concludes 
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that radical change is needed. “The global economy is crashing against 
the Earth,” he warns in … The Bridge at the End of the World. … His 
conclusion … “is that … we … must seek transformative change in … 
contemporary capitalism. 
 
The merchants of doubt have produced just the effect they most 
dreaded. Southern gentlemen are now preparing to dismantle 
capitalism. 
 
(Oreskes & Conway, 2011)  
 
 Bandura, of course, coming from Alberta and arriving at Stanford by way of 
Iowa, is not a southern gentleman. Nor is he preparing, at age 91, to dismantle 
capitalism himself. Nevertheless, Moral Disengagement is a quiet but firm voice 
supporting views of those like Speth who have called for transformative change in 
contemporary capitalism in order to address the climate crisis. 
Recommendations 
 Most big U.S. environmental groups consult with climate communication 
experts on effective messaging. These experts are generally trained in psychology or 
communications. The focus on climate-communication training is often on how to 
communicate the science. That is certainly understandable, since the science is 
complex and the public’s knowledge of it and how science research in general works 
is limited. The remarkable success of corporate-funded climate-science denial has 
dramatically increased the need for honest, accurate, clear communication about 
climate science.  
 But climate messaging that sticks to communicating only, or even primarily, 
climate science is far too limited. Most Americans now recognize that climate change 
is real and is happening now (Leiserowitz et al., 2017). Bill McKibben noted (in the 
quote on the title page of this paper) that most of us know the general outlines of 
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what we need to know from the physical sciences “about the causes and 
consequences of our” climate-altering greenhouse-gas emissions. But, McKibben 
continued, “[w]hat we don’t know is how to stop ourselves, which is why … the 
social sciences are so important from here on out.” A true understanding of our 
current climate change predicament will require interdisciplinary scholarship and 
effective communication of that scholarship. Climate change is often called an “all 
hands on deck” problem. There is a need for clear communication between and 
about the physical and social sciences, and the humanities as well.  
 Climate messaging in the coming years needs to expand beyond climate 
science and focus more on explaining how our social, political, and economic 
systems caused this crisis and how they are thwarting efforts to address it. In terms 
of Albert Bandura’s two theories discussed in this paper, that means ensuring that 
we honestly analyze the full ramifications of what we are up against, including the 
worldwide moral implications of our past and current failures to reduce emissions at 
an appropriate rate. That also includes honestly talking and thinking about, and then 
addressing, overconsumption in the U.S. and other developed nations—as Pope 
Francis, Speth, Orr, and a number of others, now including Bandura, have urged us 
to do. That means breaking the current spiral of silence, where so many Americans 
rarely talk about climate change or hear others discuss it. But it also means—
perhaps more importantly—breaking the other form of partial, implicatory climate 
silence, where even those who do discuss climate change regularly often avoid frank 
discussion of its full effects and implications around the world.  
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 The sociologist Kari Norgaard has examined climate silence in both Norway 
and the U.S. in her masterly book Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions, and 
Everyday Life (Norgaard, 2011). The “denial” in her title, refers not just (in fact not 
even primarily) to the outright climate-science denial found in the U.S.  She 
acknowledges that that sort of denial is bad, but argues persuasively that “it is 
overshadowed by a more insidious problem, the larger number of people who 
express concern but fail to act” (Norgaard, 2011)(179).  And that failure to act, in 
turn, is linked to silence. She notes that “[b]efore an issue can make it into a council 
meeting, onto picket signs, into the framing of a local news story, or into a 
newspaper editorial, somebody has to start talking about it” (Norgaard, 2011)(52). 
The historian Eric Foner explained recently that “[m]ore than any other movement 
… abolitionism provided the template for how to achieve radical change in America. 
The abolitionists’ first task was to destroy the conspiracy of silence by which 
political parties, churches, and other institutions sought to exclude slavery from 
public debate” (Foner, 2017)(77). Similarly, the movement battling the AIDS 
epidemic had to struggle against a socially constructed silence surrounding the 
disease. The effort to break that silence and oppose discrimination and government 
inaction began with posters appearing all over New York City saying “Silence = 
Death” (Zerubavel, 2007)(87) (Sullivan, 2016). 
 Norgaard describes climate silence—both actual silence as well as partial, 
implicatory silences of the sort discussed above—as a collective, socially organized 
denial. Citing Cohen, Zerubavel, and other scholars, she notes that “social norms of 
attention, conversation, and emotion—that is the social standard of what is ‘normal’ 
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to think and talk about and feel—are powerful, albeit largely invisible forces that 
shape what we actually do think and talk about and feel” (Norgaard, 2011)(132). 
 Norgaard further links climate silence to how power is controlled and 
exercised in society—“[h]ow control in modern societies is maintained through 
consent to ruling ideas rather than direct imposition of force.” She describes this as 
the “third dimension of power,” a concept devised by the sociologist Steven Lukes. 
That power is especially difficult to challenge because it is difficult to see. (Lukes, 
2005; Norgaard, 2011)(11)(133). We see this in the U.S. in the general acceptance of 
neoliberalism and the focus on markets and economic growth, making it almost 
unthinkable for many to challenge those concepts. And we see this also in the fact 
that challenging American consumption or growth, or linking them to climate 
change, is almost taboo.  
 Several sociologists have criticized climate-communication experts, and 
environmental groups’ reliance on such experts in crafting climate-change 
messaging. Elizabeth Shove questions efforts to change individuals’ behavior 
through messaging, because such an approach “obscures the extent to which 
governments sustain unsustainable economic institutions and ways of life, and the 
extent to which they have a hand in structuring options and possibilities” (Shove, 
2010). Robert Brulle makes a similar point, arguing that  
climate communication strategies … lack any contextual basis within a 
larger theoretical structure of the role of communication in facilitating 
large-scale social change processes. This theoretical deficit leads to 
the development of climate messaging strategies that support short-
term pragmatic actions that fit within economic and political 
imperatives, but fail to address meaningfully the ecological 
imperatives defined by global warming.  And this also reinforces 
existing relationships of power and institutional dynamics. 
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(Brulle, 2010)(emphasis added). 
 Environmental groups and climate-communication experts would do well to 
work more with sociologists, including those who have been critical of climate 
communication strategies. Sociologists have suggested this as well. Brulle and 
Dunlap have called for “[p]ublic sociology—an effort to engage the public beyond 
the academy. This can illustrate how the causes of climate change are interwoven 
into our current social, political, and economic order” (Brulle & Dunlap, 2015)(17). 
They further argue that “[t]he dominant climate change frame used in official 
reports depoliticizes the discussion of climate change and marginalizes analyses of 
the socioeconomic processes that generate and perpetuate it. … One of the most 
pressing contributions [sociology] can make is to legitimate big questions, especially 
the ability of the current global economic system to take the steps needed to avoid 
catastrophic climate change” (Dunlap & Brulle, 2015)(413, 430).  
 In the final pages of Self Efficacy, Bandura describes the need for “social 
initiatives” to effect “significant social change,” and notes that “[s]ocial reforms are 
typically the product of an efficacious and highly committed minority.” He says 
“[t]he more people believe that unified effort is necessary and that they have a 
moral obligation to do their part, the more they will engage in political action” 
(Bandura, 1997)(487-89, 525). This—building a movement of committed efficacious 
people to effect major change—is very similar to what sociologists such as Brulle, 
Dunlap, Norgaard, and others say is required to address climate change, and 
certainly most climate communication experts would agree. The question, of course, 
is how best to do that, and sociologists have valuable ideas about that. 
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  Norgaard argues that we need to develop our “sociological imagination” 
about climate change, and that talking more about climate change can potentially be 
an important step in that process (Norgaard, 2011)(121). The concept of 
sociological imagination comes from C. Wright Mills’s influential book of the same 
name. Norgaard describes it as “that ‘quality of mind necessary to grasp the 
constant interplay between our private lives and the political world’” (Norgaard, 
2011)(43) quoting (Mills, 2000)(4).  Mills further describes sociological imagination 
as “the capacity to shift from one perspective to another” (Mills, 2000)(7). Norgaard  
notes “the importance of conversation for a sociological imagination and the 
formation of political power” (Norgaard, 2011)(121). Stated another way, silence, 
including partial (implicatory) silence, is not conducive to building a sociological 
imagination, or a strong climate movement. 
 Norgaard also cites a need for those in the “privileged” developed Western 
nations to enhance our “moral imagination.” With climate change “[t]here will be 
more and more opportunities for privileged people to develop a moral imagination 
and imagine the reality of what is happening …” to less privileged people living in 
poverty around the world (Norgaard, 2011)(222). That sounds very much like 
Bandura’s call to find ways to pierce our moral disengagement surrounding climate 
change, and echoes his call to exercise “the extraordinary power of humanization to 
curb inhumane practices” (Bandura, 2016)(446). 
 Other sociologists have also found “imagination” to be a key to 
understanding the causes of our climate predicament, as well as to finding ways 
forward. Ulrich Beck argues that the climate crisis requires that we find “new ways 
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of seeing the world, being in the world, and imagining and doing politics” (Beck, 
2016)(181). Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derluguian say that climate change is a 
“cris[i]s of the imagination” (Calhoun & Derluguian, 2011). 
 Similarly, the writer Amitav Ghosh decries “the broader imaginative and 
cultural failure that lies at the heart of the climate crisis.” He says that “to imagine 
other forms of human existence is exactly the challenge that is posed by the climate 
crisis; for if there is one thing that global warming has made perfectly clear it is that 
to think about the world only as it is amounts to a formula for collective suicide. We 
need, rather, to envision what it might be” (Ghosh, 2016)(8, 128-29). This sort of 
imagining, and expanding our sociological and moral imaginations, can be greatly 
aided by ending our climate silence, and by challenging moral disengagement and 
addressing the important worldwide moral issues surrounding climate change. 
 Scholars have noted that simply delivering moral messages on climate 
change does not necessarily induce action to address the problem, much less create 
dedicated climate activists. That is at least in part because “understanding climate 
change as a moral imperative does not occur automatically, at an intuitive level. 
Instead it requires cold, cognitively demanding and ultimately relatively less 
motivating, moral reasoning” (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012)(244). In fact, moral 
messages can even backfire, causing people not inclined towards climate action to 
reinforce their negative views (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012; Täuber, Zomeren, & 
Kutlaca, 2014). Markowitz and Sharif, citing the philosopher Dale Jamieson, explain 
that one reason why people find it hard to discern a moral issue is that climate 
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change “lacks the features of an intentional moral transgression” (Jamieson, 2009; 
Markowitz & Shariff, 2012)(244).  
 But that is no longer entirely true. Evidence in recent years has shown the 
key role of corporate and conservative-think-tank funding of climate-science denial, 
(Dunlap & McCright, 2015). Efforts by environmental and other progressive groups 
to call out and shame such morally disengaged support for climate denialism have 
met with some success in recent years. One example is an effort to shame 
corporations belonging to ALEC, the organization that promotes climate-science 
disinformation to state legislators. The shaming effort has led to more than 100 
major U.S. corporations pulling out of ALEC, some of them specifically citing its 
promotion of climate-science denial (Light, 2016).  
 There is promise in such a public shaming approach, which would be even 
more effective if business executives of good faith would join in the effort. Michael 
Mann, the UCLA sociologist, hopes for an eventual “split among capitalists, with low 
emitters turning against high ones” (M. Mann, 2013)(383). But so far corporations 
that have expressed serious concern about climate change have limited their action 
to steps like procuring clean energy, or pulling themselves out of ALEC, but usually 
very quietly and without calling for other corporations to join the exodus. Major 
corporations have generally opted not to lobby publicly or forcefully for legislative 
action on climate change, even when their business is suffering from climate-change 
effects. As U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse puts it, “Washington's dirty secret is 
that even the American companies that are really good on sustainability put net zero 
effort into lobbying Congress on climate change” (Whitehouse, 2016). Nor do 
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corporations or their leaders generally call out publicly the bad acts of those 
corporations, usually high-emitting ones, that support climate denial and oppose 
efforts to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. This sort of quietness on the part of 
powerful, influential business leaders is a particularly insidious form of climate 
silence. The failure of American business leaders to publicly support strong action 
on climate change, and their failure to publicly condemn corporate-funded climate-
science denial, is a hugely damaging instance of moral disengagement. It brings to 
mind Martin Luther King Jr.’s comment about those white people during the civil 
rights era who privately disavowed racism, but failed to publicly condemn or work 
to stop the racists among them: “We will have to repent in this generation not 
merely for the hateful words and actions of bad people but for the appalling silence 
of the good people” (King, 1994). 
 In the wake of President Trump’s announcement of efforts to roll back 
President Obama’s climate actions, including the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, a few 
corporate executives did criticize the president’s move, albeit in generally mild 
tones (Lartey, 2017; Tabuchi & Cardwell, 2017). Far stronger denunciations of 
climate obstructionism, from far more executives, will be required to create the split 
among capitalists that the sociologist Mann calls for to break our current impasse. 
 The philosopher Dale Jamieson explains that what is needed to get more 
people to see climate change as a moral issue is a process called “moralization,” a 
process whereby a societal practice previously thought to be good, or at least 
harmless, comes to be viewed as wrong and immoral (Jamieson, 2014). Such a 
process occurred with respect to cigarette smoking over the past 50 years (Rozin, 
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1999). A moralization process about burning fossil fuels is underway in America 
and around the world, but it is proceeding much too slowly, and has at times slowed 
or almost stopped, when it continually needs to accelerate.  
 In a fascinating account of moralization at work in the area around 
Yellowstone National Park, the sociologist Justin Farrell noted that morality and 
religion are at the heart of environmental conflicts. He broadens his definition of 
religion to encompass not just organized religion but also deep-seated moral and 
cultural beliefs: “the thick webs of meaning that structure our lives and propel our 
behavior” (Farrell, 2015). Farrell investigated several intractable environmental 
disputes between what he calls “Old West” inhabitants of the Yellowstone region 
(such as ranchers and farmers) and “New West” inhabitants (such as retirees, 
second-home owners, and people who can work remotely from anywhere with an 
Internet connection).  He found that the arrival of New West people over the past 40 
years, and their concern over environmental issues, led to “moral devaluation” of 
the Old West way of life. Arrival of New Westerners began a “struggle to enact and 
sustain moral order, as competing groups erect[ed] new moral boundaries in the 
fight to transform their opponents' sacred stories and core intrinsic values from 
right to wrong, good to evil, and virtuous to virtueless” (Farrell, 2015)(68). This, in 
turn made the conflict between the old and new ways particularly intractable, 
because “it is one thing to hear that your old way of life is outdated or economically 
obsolete, but it is another to hear that it is morally wrong and spiritually bankrupt” 
(Farrell, 2015)(69). 
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 The process Farrell describes at Yellowstone is a microcosm of the much 
larger and more complex moralization process that is just starting across the world 
involving climate change. But with climate change, many people around the world 
are both Old West and New West at the same time. Our old way of life, so dependent 
on fossil fuels, is changing, although not nearly fast enough. We see both promise, 
but mostly challenge, in what will be replacing it. All of us, and especially all of us in 
high-consumption, high-emission societies, are seeing our old (or, to be more 
precise, current) way of life morally devalued. It is in this sense that Beck, Ghosh, 
Norgaard, and others argue that we need new ways of imagining ourselves and our 
place in the world. That is indeed a challenge—perhaps a challenge we might be 
able to meet. But not if we aren’t discussing it. 
Conclusion 
 In closing I return to Albert Bandura’s point, on the final page of Moral 
Disengagement, that we should remember “the extraordinary power of 
humanization to curb inhumane practices” (Bandura, 2016)(446). To do that with 
respect to climate change requires both a sense of what Bandura calls “common 
humanity” as to all the world’s people, and also an understanding that failing to 
address climate change with urgency is an inhumane practice. Addressing climate 
change is a huge task. It will require, among many other things, tremendous self-
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